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SOME ASPECTS OF RECENT GERMAN PHILOSOPHY.¹

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In another publication² I have endeavored to present the above-named topic in its general bearings, showing the situation to be one of hesitancy and transition, with a remarkable tendency towards a high and even exaggerated estimation of the empirical methods that distinguish the philosophic school historic in England, the rallying-cry of "Back to Kant!" having been succeeded by a more adventurous one of "Beyond Kant!" and this "beyond," mainly under the dominating pressure of the current interest in the theories of evolution and natural selection, being construed as lying in the region of that empiricism of which these theories are the boasted victorious result. In the present article we come to the details and the *personnel* of the more prevalent and typical views. It will be of advantage to consider these under two leading points of view: first, as operating in German society at large; and, secondly, in the phases confined to the universities.

¹ In substance, a lecture given at the Concord School of Philosophy, July 19, 1882.

² See the report of Professor Howison's remarks, in "The Concord Lectures." Cambridge: Moses King, 1883.

PHILOSOPHY IN GERMAN SOCIETY GENERALLY.

In the total stream of present German thought there are discernible three main currents—the idealistic, the materialistic, and the agnostic, or “critical,” as its adherents prefer to name it. This division, however, is not distinctive of the present period, being merely the continuation of a world-old divergence in doctrine. But it is distinctive of the present situation, that, as already indicated, these several views are now all defended from stand-points more or less empirical. In the case of materialism, to be sure, this is natural and in no wise unexpected; but the occurrence of it in the case of idealism and of agnosticism, after Kant’s day and in his own land, and among thinkers long given to the study of his works, is a genuine surprise. That the very principles of the “Critique of Pure Reason,” the historic stronghold of the *a priori*, should suffer the complete transformation of being made to support empiricism, is a performance truly astonishing. Yet it has been managed, and constitutes the distinguishing feat of the so-called Neo-Kantians.

Each of these three main movements has a leading representative. There are thus three men who challenge our attention, as in their several ways typical of the dominant intellectual interests of their day—Eduard von Hartmann, Eugen Dühring, and Friedrich Albert Lange. The first stands for such idealism as is now in vogue, derived in a long line of degeneration from Hegel, through such self-styled adherents as Strauss and Arnold Ruge, Bruno Baur and Feuerbach, and from Kant through the distorting medium of Schopenhauer; the second represents materialism, with the singular trait of blending with the legitimate line of its empirical defences certain remarkable elements of a transcendental logic; the third represents agnosticism, with the additional and peculiar interest of being the Neo-Kantian *par excellence*.

Hartmann was born in Berlin, in 1842, the son of a general in the Prussian army, in which he held a commission himself till disease that left him a permanent cripple turned him aside into the career of letters. Dühring, also born in Berlin, in 1833, began his career in the Prussian department of justice, but was ere long compelled to abandon this, through disease that deprived him of his sight. In spite of his blindness, however, he has kept up the

most copious production and publication.¹ But, in contrast to Hartmann, who leads the quiet life of a man of letters well to do, he has tasted no little of the bitterness of the human lot. For many years he won some bread and much reputation as a *privat-docent* at the University of Berlin ; but, in 1877, he was dismissed from this office on account of his persistent and bitter attacks on some of the scientific and philosophical performances of certain of his colleagues, particularly Helmholtz ; and since then he has picked up a precarious subsistence in private life. Lange, born near Solingen, in 1828, made his university course chiefly at Bonn, where his principal interest seemed to be in philology and pedagogics, and then passed some years in practical life, partly as bookseller, partly as secretary of the Duisburg Chamber of Commerce. Later, he was made professor of philosophy at Zurich, where, in his case too, disease left its lasting marks in the effects of a surgical operation that nearly cost him his life. In 1872 he was called from Zurich to Marburg, but died there in 1875, after prolonged sufferings, in the bloom of his intellectual powers, to the unceasing regret of that large body of his younger countrymen who were beginning to see in him a philosophic force of far-reaching effect.

Though the three men were so considerably separated in years, they began to act upon the public almost simultaneously. Lange's "History of Materialism," so noted in its later form, first appeared in 1865 ; Dühring's first important work, the "Natural Dialectic," was published the same year ; while Hartmann's "Philosophy of the Unconscious" came first from the press in 1868. The main lines of their several theories we are now to trace, and endeavor to value.

In opening a study of HARTMANN and his large circle of readers, we come at once upon the sphere of an influence the vastness of whose reach in the present "Enlightened Public" of Germany it is impossible to overlook ; I refer, of course, to Schopenhauer. Hartmann is generally and justly recognized as the mental heir of Schopenhauer, in direct succession. His so-called system is, how-

¹ His works already comprise no less than twenty octavo volumes, in the various departments of metaphysics, economics, sociology, mathematics, and criticism.

ever, far inferior in intellectual quality to that of his predecessor. He differs from Schopenhauer in giving to the empirical a great predominance over the *a priori* method,¹ and in his doctrine concerning the nature of the absolute. The former fact expresses his deference to the "stupendous achievements" of recent science; the latter, his ambition to frame a system that should blend in a single higher unity whatever of preceding theory he knew—Schopenhauer's pessimism and sundry idealistic fragments, no doubt also first suggested by Schopenhauer, but in detail borrowed largely from Schelling and the "left wing" distorters and mutilators of Hegel.

Schopenhauer, seizing upon Kant's doctrine of the *ex mente* origin of nature, and the consequently phenomenal character of the world, asked the question that cannot but rise upon Kant's results—What, then, *is* this "Thing-in-itself," assumed as the source of the sensations that our *a priori* reason co-ordinates into a universe? He felt the force of Kant's arguments for the limitation of knowledge to the realm of the subject's own experiences—of the contradictions into which reason was apparently shown to fall when attempting to apply its categories to a Thing-in-itself supposed to lie beyond that realm. But he also felt the necessity of the Thing-in-itself, of an absolute, in order to the relativity that, according to Kant, was an essential feature of knowledge; and seeing, too, the chasm that separated Kant's doctrine of the will from his view of the intellect, he proposed to remedy both defects of the Kantian theory at once by the doctrine that reason is *only* theoretical, and the will not phenomenal but noumenal: in short, that the absolute is Will—a darkling, dumb outstriving, in itself unconscious, whose impulsions, by a perpetual thwarting from some mysterious Check, give rise to what we call consciousness. The whole of being was thus reduced to terms of inner or subjective life. There was the dark undertow of the ever-heaving Desire, and, woven over it, the flashing image-world of Perception: the universe was Will and Representation. Of this Will we knew nothing, save that it was insatiable; the forms of consciousness were not its expression, but its repression—its negation. Ever the

¹ The reader will easily recall his significant motto, so taking in these times: "*Speculative results by the inductive method of the natural sciences.*"

higher these rose in the ascending evolution of nature, in reaction against its wilder and wilder throbbings, ever the more bitterly must their necessary finitude thwart the infinity of its blind desire. Universal life was thus, from its own conditions and essence, foredoomed to misery: its core was anguish, its outlook was despair. And all the facts of existence, from wheresoever taken in the ascending levels of consciousness, confirmed but too darkly this haggard prophecy of *a priori* thought: everywhere the overplus of pain, everywhere illusion dispelled in disappointment. There was, and could be, but one avenue of escape—death and oblivion. On this fact rose the whole structure of ethics; the “whole duty of man” was simply this: *Suppress the will to live*. All moral feeling was summed up in pity, and all moral action in ascetic living, that, the tone of life being thus perpetually lowered, the will might slowly sink into quiescence, and life itself at last fade out into the repose and silence of annihilation.

Such was the philosophy (which, if at bottom theoretically hollow, has still on its surface a certain tragic fascination) that stimulated Hartmann to attempt a composition of like tone on the ancient theme of Man. The philosophic problem, let it be noted in passing, takes for its leading question, in the minds of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, a phase of Kant’s “What may I hope for?” The all-dominating concern for them is, What is life all worth? They are both possessed with a profound sense of the misery of existence; but while, under Schopenhauer’s treatment, the pessimistic strain seems to sound forth only at the close, and to issue from conditions that originally bear solely on the origin of experience, there can hardly be any doubt that with Hartmann the pessimism was first, and the theory of the Unconscious an afterthought to explain it. His problem has the look of being this: Given misery as the sum of existence, what must be presupposed in order to account for it?

The method and the contents of his solution both show what a weight empirical evidence has with him in contrast with dialectical. He professes a certain allegiance to the latter, and he makes frequent resort also to *a priori* deduction of the most antiquated sort; but his general drift to fact, induction, and analogy is the patent and distinguishing feature of his book. He seizes upon a striking but occult class of facts in our psychological history, as

containing the explanation of his problem, and, indeed, of life itself. There is given in our very experience, he says, the manifest presence of an unconscious agency. He refers, in this, to the class of experiences nowadays commonly grouped under the term "reflex action"—facts of somnambulism, trance, clairvoyance, and instinctive knowledge; all those "unconscious modifications," in short, the emphasizing of which formed such a memorable dissonance in the thinking of Sir William Hamilton. The Unconscious is actually here *with* us, Hartmann holds; there is a something beneath our consciousness that performs for us, even when consciousness is suspended, all that is most characteristic of life, and that, too, with a swift and infallible surety and precision; what less, then, can we do than accept this Unconscious as the one and absolute reality? We accept; and so come by the *Philosophy of the Unconscious*.

Here, however, Hartmann is confronted by the warning of Kant, which, on grounds of a critical determination of the nature and limits of reason, forbids him to undertake the discussion of an object thus removed from possible experience. This warning, then, must first of all be silenced. Hartmann consequently addresses himself to the refutation of the Kantian thesis that knowledge is only of the phenomenal. Here he leaves his favorite basis of facts, and resorts necessarily to hypotheses purely *a priori*. He proceeds by showing the self-contradiction, as by Kant's own terms, of a *material* Thing-in-itself—a supposed background hid, as it were, *behind* the vision-world of experience, this phenomenon, this apparition, rising thus between the thing and the mind; and then proposes, as the remedy, the bringing of this absolute *within* the film of the apparition, and, so to speak, between it and the mind. In short, he makes his Unconscious, as the absolute, the common source of two parallel streams of appearance—the one objective, the sensible world itself; the other subjective, the stream of our conscious perceptions of the world.¹ These two streams, as both flowing from the one Unconscious, under identically corresponding conditions, are in incessant counterpart. Thus, knowledge, though not a copy of natural objects, is an exact counter-image to them, engendered from a common source. Con-

¹ A reminiscence, here, of Spinoza.

consciousness and nature are both pure show (*Schein*); the world is an "objective apparition" (*ein objectiver Schein*), and perception is a duplicate "subjective apparition" (*ein subjectiver Schein*), and both are exhaled mist-like from the depths of the Unconscious. Existence is thus doubled throughout; space, time, and the causal nexus are duplicated too, as well as the units they contain or connect.

The Kantian doctrine—that space, time, and causation are merely subjective—being considered thus disposed of, its corollary of the empirical limitation of knowledge likewise falls away, and Hartmann may proceed, he thinks, with his metaphysical programme. First, however, the method of philosophy must be more precisely accentuated. *How* can knowledge of the absolute, which lies (as the Unconscious) wholly beyond our consciousness, ever arise? By virtue of two facts, replies Hartmann: our "mystic sense of union with the Unconscious," and that uniformity of nature which forms the basis of induction. The organon of philosophy has thus two factors—Mystic and Induction. From the former come all the *clews* of knowledge, the mysterious "suggestions" of the Unconscious itself; from the latter, the *verification* of these, as followed out in the complicated system of experience. It is by the latter alone that philosophy distinguishes itself from religion: for both flow alike from the mystic of the "suggestions," while religion retains in the form of myth those mysterious whisperings which philosophy, following the self-revelation of nature in induction, lays bare in their clear and literal truth.

In the light of this method, now, the Unconscious so far reveals its real nature that we know it is something infallibly and infinitely intelligent. Strictly, it is not the Unconscious, but rather the Subconscious, the Unbeknown (*das Unbewusste*).¹ In its infallible infinite-swiftness of perception, however, as experience testifies of it, there is a transcendent type of the flashing inspirations of genius. It is thus not *self*-conscious; its intelligence is clairvoyant, and has no "large discourse of reason," that "sees the end in the beginning." But, as intelligent energy, it has the two constituents that we find present in all intelligent activity within experience—will and representation. And here is the point at which

¹ "Zekle crep' up quite unbeknown."—LOWELL: *The Courtin*'.

to correct and complete Schopenhauer's doctrine of the absolute. Not will is the absolute; for will as well as representation is part of conscious experience; will is itself phenomenal. Rather are will and representation the two co-ordinate primal manifestations of the one Unconscious. Here, too, is the truth of the famous *Neutrum*—the something neither subject nor object—that Schelling set up for the absolute; and no longer, thinks Hartmann, the target for a Hegel's "the absolute, popping up as if shot from a pistol," since it is now construed in terms vouched for by actual experience. Moreover, the conception is here found that will embosom the vast system of Hegel himself: the all-embracing "Logical Idea" (*das logische Idee*) falls as a mere constituent into the vaster being of the Unconscious; for what is the Unconscious, as revealed in experience, but that which works by the incessant interplay of representation and will? And just as will in its essence is mere blind struggle, so is representation in *its* essence nothing other than luminous idea—the all-embracing logical bond that grasps the vague of sensation into distinct terms, and these terms again into systems, and these systems at last into a single organic unity of thought.¹ The Unconscious, then, is primordially will and idea; and from the necessary interplay of these arose the twofold world of finitude, pouring forth from the Unconscious in the counterpart streams of object and subject, of sensible world and conscious perception.

Hartmann is now at length well ashore on the familiar coasts of Schopenhauerland. This world-child of clear-eyed virgin Idea and darkling brutal Will is no product of far-sighted love, endowed with an exhaustless future of joy: it is the offspring of chance, and its future carries in its very core the germs of ever-expanding misery. This gloomy theme Hartmann pursues over all the provinces of experience, seeking to prove that suffering everywhere outbalances happiness, that "he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow," the pitch of anguish rising ever higher and higher as nature ascends in the scale of consciousness, and especially as man enlarges and quickens that intelligence whose chief result must, from the nature of the case, be the keener apprehension of the deceitfulness of life. Nor, continues Hartmann,

¹ Note the one-sided and superficial construction here put upon Hegel's theory.

let any one hope to evade this conclusion by theories of possible compensation. Men, to be sure, usually live in one or another of three stages of illusion in regard to this essential misery of life: they either think that, even in this world, the sum of joy so far exceeds the sum of sorrow as to make existence here essentially good; or, if sobered out of this by inexorable experience, they take refuge in the hereafter, in the prospect of an endless opportunity beyond the grave—a refuge of lies, since the Unconscious is the sole subject of conscious life, there is no individual self, death is simply subsidence into the absolute vagueness, and immortality is therefore a delusion; or, finally, surrendering both of these dreams, they resort to the future, and indulge in the illusion of hope—the world can yet be made the abode of happiness, and let us make it so. But, admonishes Hartmann, all these fancies ignore the contradiction that lies in the very heart of existence; there is but one plain moral in the drama of experience, and that is the utter worthlessness of life. Ethics consequently sums itself up in the single precept, *Make an end of it!* The will being in its essence a wild unrest, both metaphysics and experience teach that the only way of escape from the misery inherent in the nature of life is to bring the will to quiescence; in short, to blot it out of being. Our sole intelligent desire, won in the bitter school of experience, is the longing for release from struggling, the wish to be delivered from this delusive *Maya* of consciousness and to pass into motionless *Nirwāna*. Hasten, then, the day when the pitch of misery shall have risen to the frenzy of despair, and mankind in united delirium shall execute a universal *auto da fé*, and, by final self-immolation, end the tragedy of existence forever.

Nevertheless, while this is the sum of its theory, ethics may have the important practical question to settle, How shall we make an end of things the surest and soonest? There is here indeed no *duty*; there *is* no such thing as duty: there is simply a possible satisfaction of the desire for release from misery; but to this end there may be an alternative of means. We may each promote the end by a negative or by a positive agency. By following the traditional standards of virtue, we may advance society in order, peace, prosperity, and apparent welfare, the real outcome of which, however, is but the profounder despair; or we may, by passion, fraud, and violence, heighten the rising flood of

misery directly. Which each will do is matter of temperament and circumstance. Pessimism thus does nothing actively to promote what traditional ethics would brand as immorality; it merely leaves the so-called morality or immorality to be dealt with by the fate inherent in existence. The interaction of both is the force that drives the universe assuredly to its desired dissolution.

Moreover, the negative side of pessimist ethics gives rise to problems of history, of politics, of religion; for one theory of these matters, put in practice, may promote the final catastrophe more surely and swiftly than another. Thus, pessimism has its philosophy of history, in which history appears as the evolution of the three stages of illusion mentioned above. The great scene of the first stage was the pagan world, typical in which was the Hellenic joy in sensuous life, and the Roman glory in conquest and organization. That of the second is Christendom, so far as it is untouched by decay of its essential dogma. That of the third is the modern world of "enlightenment," of "advanced" thinking, of political and economic reorganization in the interest of "the good time coming." Following all is the surely predestined disillusion that is to lead to the final dissolution. Pessimism has, too, its philosophy of politics. Its ideal polity is a "strong government," based on the theory of socialism and administered in its interest to the remotest detail. Pessimism has, finally, its philosophy of religion, according to which religion is the consecration in myth and mystery of the meaning that philosophy puts rationally. Religion, therefore, undergoes an evolution side by side with the development of philosophy. Accordingly, pessimism sees all religions arrayed in two successive groups—the religions of illusion and the religion of disillusion. The former break up again in accordance with the "three stages." Paganism is the religion of the first stage; Christianity, untainted by rationalism, that of the second; "free religion," "liberal Christianity," the "positive religion," "ethical culture," the "church of humanity"—all the manifold experiments at making a "religion" whose interest is to be centred in this world alone—constitute that of the third. Over against all these stands Hartmann's "religion of the future," whose priests are to celebrate the doctrine, solemnize the rites, and inspire the devotees of the great Nirwāna—the eternal silence and blank.

These are the main lines of the theory that engages the adherence of that throng of *blasés* sentimentalists who make up the body of Hartmann's admirers. In contrast with the Germany that responded to the sober and invigorating views of a Kant, a Fichte, or a Hegel, these people are a curious and disheartening study. Apart from the revolt that minds of any real moral vigor must feel at such results, the want of intellectual fibre betrayed in the acceptance of this mesh of contradictions is a telling evidence of decline in theoretical tone among the "cultivated classes." Limp as this "system" hangs, with its preposterous attempt to construe the absolute by mere pictorial thinking, by adjustments of components set side by side, by a temporal antecedence to the world of nature, in short, by means of categories strictly mechanical, flung on the screen of space and time—to say nothing of its bald ignoring of the chasm between consciousness and the Unconscious, of its absolute at once unconscious and conscious, of its deduction of the reality of knowledge from the assumed issuance of duplicate worlds from the Unconscious, and its then using this reality of knowledge to establish this very issuance—flimsy as all this is, there seems to be a sufficient multitude to whom it gives a satisfaction, and who are even willing to do battle, at least on field of paper and under fire of ink, for the high privilege of a general annihilation in the distant future. It is true, however, and fortunate for Germany, as indeed for the world, that this class of minds forms only a portion of the public; that authority goes by weight and not by numbers; and that Germans of the higher and more thorough order of culture have already discerned the bubble, and have pricked it without pity. It would be unjust, however, to take leave of Hartmann and Schopenhauer without emphatically acknowledging the service they have rendered by their complete unveiling of the pessimism necessarily inherent in every theory that makes the absolute impersonal.

When we turn now to DÜHRING, we find ourselves suddenly in the opposite extreme of the emotional climate. Dühring is materialist, but he is optimist still more. Indeed, it seems not unlikely that he is optimist before he is materialist, just as Hartmann is pessimist first and expounder of the Unconscious afterwards. In taking him as the representative of materialism, I have purposely

passed by names far more widely known—those of Moleschott, Büchner, and Carl Vogt, for instance—both because these are all men of popular rather than of severe methods, having far less weight in the scientific world than he, and because he is a man of far more scope, of really great and thorough attainments, of positive originality, and of a certain delicacy of intellectual perception essential to a great thinker.¹ Haeckel, who, by his extravagant ardor in advocating atheistic evolution, his vast knowledge of biological details, and his high repute among his associates in science, fills so large a place in the minds of readers as a representative of materialism, must also here give way to Dühring, on the ground of not concerning himself seriously with the philosophic foundations of the theory, but only with such of its phenomenal details as belong more especially to organic existence.

Dühring names his system the *Philosophy of the Actual*. This title sounds almost like a direct challenge to Hartmann, as much as to say, "No mystical subconscious or incognizable Background *here!*" And to have this really so is Dühring's first and last endeavor. The absolute for him is just this world of sense, taken literally as we find it: briefly and frankly, *matter*. As we perceive and think it, so it *is*—extended, figured, resistant, moving; a total of separate units collected into a figured whole and into a uniformity of processes by mechanical causation: in short, a *variable constant*. This conception of an indissoluble polar union between Permanence and Change is, according to Dühring, the vital nerve of the Actual, and the key to its entire philosophy.² But this polar coherence, he thinks, is only possible by the Actual's consisting of certain primitive elements, definite in size, figure, and number, subject to definite laws of combination and change of combination. The permanent in the Actual is thus (1) Atoms,

¹ A writer more correctly to be compared with Dühring is Czolbe, of Königsberg, author of a naturalistic theory expounded in his "Limits of Human Knowledge on the Basis of the Mechanical Principle," who died in 1873. But his views did not, like Dühring's, develop themselves into a comprehensive philosophy, applied to all the provinces of life. He belonged, too, rather to the previous generation of thinkers than to this, and was known there as an opponent of Lotze. The latter I have likewise passed by later on, in the agnostic-idealist reference, in spite of his acknowledged bearing on the position of Lange, mainly for reasons similar to those that led me to disregard Czolbe.

² In this he undoubtedly presents a one-sided reflection from Hegel, with whom Identity and Difference are the elementary dynamic "moments" of the absolute Idea.

(2) Types, or the primitive Kinds of the atoms, the origin of species in nature, and (3) Laws, determining the possible combinations of the types and the order of succession in these combinations. The variable, on the other hand, is the series of changing combinations as they actually occur; these amount simply to a change in the *form* of the Actual, in its parts and in its whole. The evolution of this form moves towards a certain result, which, as necessarily evolved from the primitive conditions and therefore involved in them, may be regarded, though only in the sense of a mechanical destination, as the *Final Purpose of the World*. The Actual, then, taken in its entire career and being, presents the form of a self-completing system of relations. In other words, there is a *Logic of Nature*, inherent in the world itself. To reproduce this logic in the form of our knowledge is the aim and sum of science; to reproduce it not only so, but also in disposition and life, is the sum of philosophy. Philosophy being thus the aim and the distilled result of all the sciences, its method and organon must be identical with theirs. The method is hypothesis, verified by experimental induction and criticised by thought. The organon is the imagination checked by the understanding, and the understanding checked by dialectic: the former gives us the requisite hypotheses; the latter tests and settles their rival claims, the dialectic purging it from the illusory contradictions into which it naturally runs when facing the problems of ultimate reality. These problems all concern the notion of infinity, either in the form of the infinitely great or the infinitely small; and the contradictions, seemingly unavoidable, to which they give rise, are in truth, says Dühring, mere illusions, springing from the lack of a First Principle that has genuine reality. These contradictions, he continues, formed the basis of Kant's boasted dialectic, by which he is thought to have exposed the illusion hiding in our very faculties: he would have it that they issue from the inmost nature of the understanding when it presumes to grapple with things as they are; but their appearance in the form of his famous "Antinomies" was in fact owing to his imperfect conception of the origin of knowledge, and his consequent falsification of nature into a mere phenomenon. With this assertion, Dühring confronts Kant's standing challenge, "How can you make out that perceptions and thoughts are true of the Real, when from the nature of

the case they must be products of our human organization, and therefore shut in to the perpetual contemplation of—themselves?” By searching in the right place, he answers in effect, and finding that “*common root*” of sense and understanding of which you yourself, Kant, have more than rarely spoken, but the investigation of which you have found it so much easier to evade. What sort of “criticism of reason” is it that stops with thrusting experience into the limbo of an abstraction called the *a priori*, and never asking what the *Prius* thus implied must be? Man brings his perceptive and thinking organization into the world with him, doubtless; but from whence? Whence indeed, if not from the bosom of Nature? Let us but once think the Actual as the Actual—as a continuous whole, unfolding towards its Final Purpose—with man and his conscious organism veritably *in* it, and the reality of knowledge becomes intelligible enough. For consciousness is then no longer an imprinted *copy* of things, as the truth-cancelling and unthinkable theory of dualism makes it, but becomes instead a new *setting* of them, pushed forth from the same original stock; man thus inherits the contents and the logical system of nature by direct transmission, and consciousness, while remaining self-converse, becomes *self-converse in which the process of the world is re-enacted*.¹ And we reach in this way not only the reality of knowledge, but the ground for the occurrence of contradictions in it, and the principle of a dialectic that will solve them. This *Natural Dialectic*—proceeds Dühring, in his treatise under that title—moves in the following manner: Knowledge, though identical with the Actual in contents, differs from it in form; it is, in fact, just the translation of those contents from the form of object into that of subject—from the form of being into that of knowing. Now, a leading trait of this subjectivity is its sense of *possibility*—of the power to use the active synthesis that works in nature, and that now in mind works as the secret of its thinking, with an indefinite freedom. In short, it possesses *imagination*. As a consequence, it falls under the illusion of the false-infinite (Spinoza’s *infinitum imaginationis*), and assumes that the principles of its logical synthesis—space, time, and causation—are as infinite in the object-world as they appear

¹ This reminiscence of Leibnitz’s monadology is extremely noteworthy.

to be in itself. But to suppose causation, time, and space to be really infinite would strip the Actual of the quality of an absolute, and thus annul reality altogether. For, first, causation cannot in fact run backwards infinitely, but must at some time or other have absolutely *begun* ; and it must break off its retrograde in logic as well as in time—must cease in respect to “grounds” as well as in reference to “causes :” for real causation belongs only to events and change, not to Being and identity, and hence there must come a point where the questions *What caused it* and *Why* are finally silenced, else there would be nothing absolute ; whereas *the unde-rived necessity of Being, and of its elements and laws, is the first condition for a rational view of the world.* Secondly, real time cannot be infinite : for real time is nothing but the total duration of causal changes ; and *to suppose this infinite would, reckoning backwards, make the beginning of causation, just established, close an infinite duration.* Finally, real space is simply the extent of the sum-total of atoms : but this must be finite, because *the number of atoms is necessarily definite ; for, if it were not, the Actual of perception, as a series of changes by definite combination, would be impossible.* Objective space, time, and causation are thus all finite ; the persuasion that they are infinite, with all the consequent array of counterpart propositions contradicting the foregoing, is an illusion arising from neglect of the differences between object and subject. Subjective space, time, and causation have, to be sure, a *quasi* infinity ; yet our authentic thought, even about them, dissolves this illusion and agrees with reality as soon as the understanding brings its dialectic to bear. Here, then, concludes Dühring, the whole Kantian fog-bank of Antinomies is explained and scattered : one series of Kant’s pairs of counter-judgments is entirely true ; the other comes from the false-infinite, and is the work of the imagination, uncritically mistaken by Kant for the understanding.

From this point onward, then, the metaphysics of the Actual may freely proceed. The Actual as absolute—as to its veritable Being—is eternal : time and causation apply not to its inmost *existence*, but only to its processional changes. Nevertheless, this differentiation is just as necessarily involved in its nature as is its abiding identity. The system of changes called the sensible world must accordingly, at some instant or other, have strictly *begun*.

Thenceforward the Actual, poured in its entirety into these changes, moves in a gradually varying, many-branching Figure, whose elementary components are of constant dimensions and number, but whose shape is undergoing incessant alteration, giving rise, from epoch to epoch, to forms of existence constantly new. The series of element-combinations is not recurrent, and the world-whole moves not in a circuit, but in a continual advance. This movement is carried forward by the Logic of Nature; consequently, by the combined action of causation, space, and time, which are its only ultimate principles. Hence real causation is the transfer of motion by the impact of extended parts, and the evolution of the world proceeds by the single principle of *mechanism*. Strictly, then, universal logic is simply a *Mechanics of Nature*.¹ This cosmic principle unfolds itself, primarily, in two auxiliary ones—the *Law of Difference* and the *Law of Definite Number*. The logic of the universe, bearing onward in obedience to these, must of necessity move, however, to a definite result—the above-mentioned Final Purpose of existence; that logic must play the form inherent in it out to its completion: thus the universe moves to a self-predestined *close*, and is, therefore, under a third and final law—the *Law of the Whole*. These three laws, now, are the key to all philosophy, theoretical or practical. They are, for instance, the basis of that Natural Dialectic which is to purge our logic of its subjective illusions: thus, exactly as the Law of Sufficient Reason² must limit itself, as we just now saw, by the real and higher Law of Causation, so that the universe-process may strictly *begin*, so must the other subjective logical principle, the Law of Contradiction,³ be construed not to exclude but to include the Law of Natural Antagonism; otherwise, the Mechanics of Nature would be impossible. They teach us, too, not only to recognize the presence of continuity throughout the whole of existence, but how to interpret it with precision, and not to obliterate difference in our anxiety to establish identity. The Law of Difference and the Law of Definite Number provide

¹ Dühring's earliest book of mark was a "Critical History of the General Principles of Mechanics," a work crowned with the first prize by the University of Göttingen, and held, generally, in the highest esteem. It passed to its second edition in 1877.

² That every occurrence must have a reason, and a reason sufficient to explain it.

³ That no subject can have contradictory predicates.

not only for the movement of nature through the determinate steps of the inorganic and the organic, but also for the ascent *by a specifically new element* from the former to the latter, and, within this, from the plant to the animal, and finally from the animal to man, with his rational consciousness. The whole, to be sure, must be developed through the single principle of mechanism, but the now favorite doctrine of the "Persistence of Force" violates the essential principle that specific differences—primitive types—inhere in the primordial being of the Actual, and is therefore false. So, too, the Darwinian pseudo-law of the "Struggle for Life," with its unsocial corollary of the supreme right of the strongest, must be rejected, not simply as striking at the root of ethics, but as violating the Law of the Whole. Species can arise neither by the transfer of a dead identity of force, nor by any number of "survivals" of what merely *is* or *has been*, but must come from Kinds in the primitive constitution of the Actual.

At this juncture, however, Dühring feels called upon to reconcile the fact of ascending differences with his principle of mechanical continuity, and to explain, moreover, the *original* transit from identity to difference—from the primal repose of the Actual to its unresting career of causation. But, after manifold attempts, which all imply the unmechanical hypothesis of a conscious primal purpose in his absolute, he finally takes refuge in the "mechanics of the future," which, surely, is some day to unravel the mystery. But, at any rate, he goes on, our three laws lead us securely to the completing term in the theory of the world, by settling the supreme question of the character and value of life. This question he discusses in his work entitled "The Worth of Life." He solves the problem in the optimist sense, and by means of the principle of compensation: Existence is unquestionably marred by evil, by real evil; but its dominant tone, its resistless tendency, its net result, is genuinely good. And this solution does not rest on any merely subjective accidents of temperament, but directly on the objective principles of existence itself. It is found, in short, in the Law of Difference and the Law of the Whole, and in the essential necessity—the *inevitableness*—of the being of the Actual. Existence must be judged, not by the morbid cravings of sentimentalism, fed on fantasy, but by sound sentiment, which is founded on clear understanding: when we once see distinctly into the nature of

the world, and adjust our tone and conduct to that, we shall find a sufficient comfort in life; there is a bracing satisfaction in the discriminating insight into that which *must be*. Existence has, too, a *charm*—and in *itself*; and the secret of it lies in that very variety, or difference, which constitutes the principle of its movement. Moreover, life *mounts* in differentiation, and the increased objective good of the higher levels of consciousness outweighs the increase of subjective susceptibility to pain. Still further, contrast not only heightens pleasure, but is the source of it: the sense of resistance overcome is the very root of joy; evil is the necessary foil for the reaction essential to life. Still profounder elements of good are contributed by the Law of the Whole: not only does the ascent of life to higher and higher levels point clearly to the greater fulness of existence as part of the Final Purpose, and so give play to the “influence of the ideal” in the encouraging prospect of the future, but our inseparable union with the Whole, our direct descent from nature, and our reproduction of its life in ours, imparts to us a certain *Cosmic Impulse* (Dühring calls it *der universelle Affect*), which, pressing upon the foundations of our being, fills us with a dumb sense of the oneness of nature, and binds us by forces coming from beneath consciousness, nay, from the beginnings of the world, to the totality of existence with an attachment that no sum of ills can utterly destroy. It is from this “Cosmic Impulse” that the inborn love of life and the instinct of self-preservation arise. Our delight in the landscape comes from it; likewise our delight in art, our capacity for poetry, our bent to science and philosophy, with which we would figure to ourselves the form of this treasured All. It is, finally, the source and the reality of the set of feelings consecrated by the name of religion. To deny the worth of life is, therefore, to put ourselves in conflict with the elemental forces of our being, which will subdue us in spite of our struggles.

Nevertheless, Dühring continues, though life is essentially good, there is real evil in it, and one condition of its good is that we shall rise to higher good by the spring from overcoming the evil: the world makes itself better through us as channels. In this fact we pass from theory to practice, finding in it the basis of ethics. The first principle of ethics follows from the conception that contributes so much to the excellence of the Actual—the Law of the

Whole. The highest practical precept is, *Act with supreme reference to the Whole*. But inasmuch as we are members not only of the absolute Whole, but of the lesser whole called society, we can only act in and through that; accordingly, first in the order of practical theories comes now Dühring's sociology. His writings in this field are voluminous, especially in political economy, in which he adopts and develops the views of our countryman Carey. Carey, he thinks, has revolutionized this subject. The doctrines involved in the free-trade view, especially the principle of unrestricted competition, he considers a deification of mean self-interest. They strike at the foundation of rational ethics—the supreme moral authority of the Whole. Away with them, then, and substitute instead those of benignant co-operation. This sentiment is now carried out in a corresponding philosophy of politics, in which Dühring develops an extreme socialism. That the aforesaid Whole, however, is conceived in the sense of a dominant atomism, very presently appears: the “Whole” aimed at is simply a greater force to give effect to the caprices of that order of “enlightened individual” who so ignores the mighty Whole of history as to see in the organic institutions of reason—the family, the state, the church—nothing but barriers to the career of humanity. The end of government, Dühring holds, is “to enhance the charm of life;” and here, unfortunately, in settling the practical test of enhancement, he is betrayed into destroying the profound principle on which he rested his case for the worth of life—that we must be guided by objective values, and ignore the outcries of subjective caprice. It appears to him that, down to date, there has been no considerable political or social wisdom in the world. Social organization, as well as political, ought now to undergo a complete re-creation, and all in the interest of giving the greatest possible range for each individual to act according to his views of what regard for the Whole requires. Thus, all governments armed with force are to be done away. In their stead is to come voluntary association. Democratic Communes are everywhere to replace organic States. There is to be no centralization—no one great Commune, but numbers of little ones, to suit the convenience of individual preference. There is to be universal “equality,” and women—a redeeming stroke of justice—are to share in all the vocations, offices, emoluments (and the few burdens) of society

equally with men. Instead of compulsory wedlock, there is to come voluntary union from love, the bond to cease when the passion ceases. We are now at a long remove from that hostility to self-interest that erewhile would prohibit unrestricted competition, and revolted at the selfishness of free trade. Education is to be reorganized in behalf of these conceptions, which are further supported by an appropriate philosophy of history. History is simply a continuation of the drama of nature; it tends to life, the variation of life, and the enhancement of its charm. The test of historic progress is the heightening of self-consciousness; but this Dühring takes to mean the greater and greater accentuation of the individual's sense of his validity just as he stands at each instant. The career of history has, accordingly, three periods—that of the *ancien régime*, that of the transitional present, and that of the free and exhilarating future. This future, however, is to be conducted by tolerably dry logic: much sentiment and refinement are “aristocratic.” A suitable philosophy of religion closes the general view: religion is really nothing but the “Cosmic Impulse;” historic religions are only superstitious misconceptions of this profound pulse of the universe; they are all to disappear, as essentially worthless pseudo-philosophies. The “society of the future” will neither worship nor sublimely hope. The Philosophy of the Actual has dispensed with God, and likewise with immortality. For, to say nothing of the predestined catastrophe of the universe, the individual consciousness ceases at death. There is no common basis of consciousness, each person is a perfectly self-enclosed circuit; nor is there any individual basis of it, except the body. An individual consciousness is merely a definite “situation”—one specific combination—of the world-atoms; death is its dissolution, and is therefore final oblivion.

The system that opened with such a keen vigor of theoretic purpose, and which exhibits, as contrasted with Hartmann's, so many points of a higher, firmer-knit, and subtler intelligence, has ended in a moral atomism as it began in a physical—in utter social dissolution. It is, however, only paying the penalty of inadequacy in its theoretical principle. Its root of irrationality is identical with that of Hartmann's theory—the undertaking to construe the absolute with the categories of the relative, to think the eternal in relations of time and motion. It is a merit in Dühring that

he himself lays down with great force the principle here implied ; but his conception of the absolute forces him fatally to contradict it. He will have the chain of causation once on a time *begin* ; but a beginning is necessarily a point in time, and a point in time is necessarily related to a *before* as well as to an *after*. Dühring consequently finds it impossible even to state his beginning of change without referring it to a supposed rest preceding it ; in no other way can he make room for a continuous mechanical nexus in the whole of his Actual. The Actual is thus necessarily brought *wholly* under time ; time and causation *are* carried back, whether or no, into "Being and identity," and Dühring is asserting in one breath that the absolute is *not* subject to relative categories, and yet *is* so. After his scruples about time and causation, it is remarkable that he manifests no hesitancy in applying *space* to his absolute ; he proves real space to be finite, and thus annuls his absolute as before : for so, his total Actual has a limited extent ; an extent, however, like a beginning, must be defined by something other than itself—it is unthinkable, except in contrast to a *beyond* ; thus the absolute, as really extended, is undeniably relative. The ground-scheme of Dühring's system is hence a self-contradiction ; that is, it is essentially irrational. The insufficiency of his principle exposes itself still further when he comes to discuss the origin of consciousness and the reach of knowledge. He makes a fatal misstep when he seeks the "common root" of sense and understanding in a time-and-space *prius*, ignoring the fact that he has given no answer but bald denial to the Kantian doctrine of the ideality of space and time, and that, until the supports of this doctrine are removed, there can be no use of these elements to locate a *root* of consciousness : to search for the *prius* of something, in a region still presumably the creation of that something, is an industry not likely to be largely rewarded. Dühring's entire Dialectic, like his supposed refutation of the Kantian Antinomies, rests on the assumption, which he does not argue, that there is a space, a time, and a causal progression, distinct from the thoughts to which we give those names, an assumption which he may have hoped to warrant by establishing afterwards a mechanical transit from mere vitality to consciousness ; from any serious attempt at the latter, however, his clear insight into the limitation of the Persistence of Force prevented him from making. But it is in the

practical sphere that the self-contradiction in his principle shows at its worst. This principle compels him at the outset of his ethics to set up the supreme authority of the Whole; but its lack of ethical substance brings him at the end to bare individualism. At first we feel as if he had failed to draw from it the high consequences of which it seemed capable. Why, we say, should he sink from the stern ethics of devotion to the Whole into this wretched atomism of private caprice? But we have heré the genuine drift of the system; for real morality is impossible on a pessimist basis, and Dühring's principle, in spite of his subtle and imaginative plea for it, is optimist only by illusion. The very "Whole" that is the ground and the sovereign object of our duty is in truth but a monstrous Power, whose self-centred "Purpose" is the burial of moral life, while yet only on its threshold, in a hopeless oblivion. The yearnings of her offspring, imparted to them by her "Cosmic Impulse," Nature does not share; she brings them forth, "to laugh and weep, to suffer and rejoice," for a season, then to pass to the Abyss, whereto she also, with her latest and highest, too surely is speeding. Life under such conditions is essentially worthless, let it be painted in what sounding terms it may. The resistless beat of such a theory is either to despair, as in the case of the frank pessimism of a Hartmann, or else to illusions of reconstructing the future in behalf of capricious desire. We cannot hope for the abiding; let us then turn to the satisfactions of the hour! In short, the professed hedonism of Dühring's theory is at bottom pure egoism. Covering the horror in the depths of life with a thin optimistic gloze, Actualism can have no final precept but the exhortation to cultivate the Whole so far, and only so far, as it may be means to the greatest sum of individual enjoyment: "therefore, whatsoever *thy* hand findeth to do, do *that* with thy might; for there is neither wisdom nor device nor knowledge in the grave—and thither thou goest."

In passing now to LANGE, it is not surprising to find him strongly actuated by the desire to lay a better foundation for ethics than materialism and pseudo-idealism have proved able to build. His "History of Materialism" is not properly a history, but a philosophy buttressed by history, in which, by exhibiting materialism in the utmost possibilities that ages of restatement

have been able to give it, he aims to expose its deficiencies exhaustively, and to assign the true weight which its principle and that of idealism should respectively have in a rational theory. The book has made a wide and deep impression on the younger men at the German universities, and it is perhaps not beyond the facts to say that his is at present the most decided influence at work among people of severe and technical training.

There must be sought, begins Lange, some higher stand-point than either materialism or current idealism affords; and this, he is convinced, is to be found in the doctrine of Kant, provided it be held to with rigid consistency. In his own words: "As a beaten army looks about for some strong position on which it may hope to rally, so now, for some time, has been heard on all sides the signal, *Fall back on Kant!* Still, not till recently has this retreat been really in earnest, and now it is found that his stand-point could never in strict justice be described as surmounted. To be sure, misconceptions of his meaning and the pressure of the impulse to metaphysical invention did for a while tempt his successors to endeavor the rupture of the strict limits he had drawn to speculation. But the sobering that has followed this metaphysical intoxication has compelled a return to the abandoned position; and all the more, that men see themselves again confronted by the materialism that once, on Kant's appearance, had fled and hardly left a trace." He is deeply sensible of the deficiencies of materialism, but, at the same time, appreciates the truth of a certain phase in it as against the pretences of what he takes for idealism. He says: "Materialism lacks for *rapproches* with the highest functions of man's intelligence. Contenting itself with the mere actual, it is, aside from the question of its theoretic inadmissibility, sterile for art and science, indifferent, or else inclined to egoism, in the relations of man to man." And yet, on the other hand: "The whole principle of modern philosophy, outside of our German 'spell' of *romancing with notions*, involves, with scarce an exception worth naming, a strictly natural-scientific treatment of everything given us by sense. . . . Every falsification of fact is an assault upon the foundations of our intellectual life. As against metaphysical poetizing, then, that arrogates the power to penetrate to the essence of nature, and determine from mere conceptions that which experience alone can teach us, materialism as a

counterpoise is a real benefaction." But, on the further contrary, idealism met a certain want that mere empiricism cannot supply. "The endeavor," he adds, "is almost as universal to overcome the one-sidedness of the world-image arising from mere fact. . . . Man needs a supplementing of this by an ideal world created by himself, and in such free creations the highest and noblest functions of his mind unite."

In these words Lange's general position already reveals itself. If Hartmann calls his view the *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, and Dühring his the *Philosophy of the Actual*, Lange's might similarly be named the *Philosophy of the Ideal*. He prefers, however, to speak of the Ideal, not as a philosophy, but only as a stand-point, because he wishes to include in philosophy not only the means for satisfying the craving after ideality, but that for closing with the demand for certainty. The aim of philosophy, he holds, is not a doctrine, but a method; and it is itself, when precisely defined, simply the *critical determination of the limits of the main tendencies in our faculty of consciousness*. These tendencies are two—the investigation of phenomena, and speculation upon assumed realities beyond them. Philosophy has thus two functions: the one *negative*, resulting in the critical dissolution of *all* the synthetical principles of cognition, and the stripping them of all assumed competence to the absolute, leaving their outcome purely phenomenal; the other *positive*, affirming the right and the uses of the free exercise of the speculative bent, when taken no longer as knowledge, but only as poesy.

The supports of this "Stand-point of the Ideal" are sought in a critique of the "Critique of Pure Reason," or a sort of "New Critique of Reason," whose ambition is, to bring what Lange takes as the first principle of Kant's inquiries now for the first time to a rigorous completion. This principle (with, unfortunately, too much support from Kant's own declarations in the course of the discussion over his work) is assumed to be the absolute restriction of our knowledge to experience: we have *a priori* "forms" of cognition, but they become futile when applied beyond phenomena. That Kant himself regarded this as only the principle of his *theoretical* view is, to be sure, unquestionable; but his setting up the practical reason as in itself absolute was, Lange maintains, a direct violation of it, and, in fact, was rendered impossible by it.

Will, like cognition, is for us only *phenomenon*; we cannot, then, aver with Kant that we must *be* free, but only that we must *think* ourselves free. In this, though, there is an end to Kant's grounding of ethics, and we must seek to construct a complete system by the consistent carrying out of the only certainty with which we can begin. We must return to the problem of the source and limits of cognition, where, fortunately, we can assume an *a priori* organization as having been established by Kant. The elements, too, that Kant assigned to this organization—space, time, cause, and the rest—all belong there; but Kant's attempt to settle *a priori* the exact possible number of such "forms" was necessarily futile: there is no way to determine what the contents of our *a priori* endowment are except induction. And the gradual progress of the natural sciences, particularly the modern physiology of the senses (in which the primary sensations—light, color, heat, sound, taste, odor, etc.—have all been reduced to modes of motion), points clearly to the probable omission of an essential "form" from Kant's list: *motion* should take its place among the *a priori* "forms" of sense. Indeed, one great aim of our reconstruction of the "Critique of Reason" should be to bring its doctrine into thorough accord with the results of the latest natural science. This we shall do by insisting, first, on strict observance of the limits it assigned to knowledge, and, secondly, on defining these more exactly, in accordance with the mechanical nature of sensation. In fact, we here arrive at the true import and value of materialism: for that the Actual of *experience* is explicable on mechanical principles alone, is the clear outcome of the latest science, with which it only remains to set our theory of knowledge into agreement in order at one stroke to give materialism its due, and yet its *quietus* as a scheme of the absolute. The Actual of experience, extended, moving, interacting in all its parts, and transmitting energy from one part to another under the universal law of the Persistence of Force, is from beginning to end our mere representation (*Vorstellung*): the derivation of mind from *actual* matter is therefore impossible, as it would involve the absurdity of the object's producing the subject whose testimony is the sole evidence that there *is* any object; and as for a *hypothetical* matter—a conjectural substrate beneath the actual—that is shut out of the question by the nature of the limits of possible

knowledge. For, once we are certain that our objects are strictly *ours*—are but the framing of our sensations in our *a priori* “forms”—we are thenceforth confronted with the *limiting notion* called the Thing-in-itself. The doubt, thenceforward ineradicable, of our power to pass this limit turns into certainty of our impotence to do so, when we find, as Kant shows us, that the attempt must cast our reason into systematic contradictions. Our *knowledge*, then, is confined strictly to the field of phenomena—to knowing, not what *is*, but only what exists relatively to *us*—and within this field it is further restricted to the tracing of mechanical causation; for, again by Kant’s showing, its highest category is action and reaction, and all the terms of its synthesis must be extended objects of sense: hence Du Bois-Reymond’s “Limits of Knowledge in Natural Science” become the limits of all knowledge whatever. While, then, our philosophy thus falls into step with natural science, it vindicates to materialism the entire province of nature, but excludes it forever from explaining mind.

But the relativity of our knowledge, continues Lange, with especial emphasis, reaches wider than Kant suspected, and its contradictions are profounder. The limiting Thing-in-itself Kant assumed as a reality; or, at all events, he declined to doubt its existence; but, to carry the *a priori* principle to its proper conclusion, we must now recognize the phenomenal nature of this notion itself. Our all-encompassing distinction between *thing* and *representation*, between *noumenon* and *phenomenon*, is itself a judgment *a priori*; in fact, an *illusion* of that order. It arises from our constitutional tendency to put the positive pole of the category of relation—substance, cause, agent—as if it were something *additional* to the system of experience, instead of merely a term within it. It is thus itself a contradiction, one not simply functional, but *organic*, and provokes to endless other contradictions. It is an illusion; but one which, though we recognize, we can never dispel, any more than that of the moon’s enlargement on the horizon, of the bending of the stick when thrust into the water, or of the apparition of the rainbow. But, like these, it will mislead only him who persists in the stolidity of the peasant; and as these, when comprehended, not only do not disturb our science, but continue (and in heightened measure) to quicken the pleasure of existence by their variety or their beauty, so will this ground-

dissonance of our nature, with its whole array of derivative discords, serve, when once mastered, to enrich the monotone of life and raise it to orchestral fulness and harmony. The metaphysical passion, born of this illusion, is indeed worthless for *knowledge*, but it is precious for life. In its immature stages, it burns to transcend the limits of experience, in the vain hope of bringing back *knowledge* of that mysterious Beyond; and so long as it has continued in this delusion, it has been the bane of the world. But when once freed from it, it will become, with religion and poetry, the benign solvent of all the ills of living. It springs from the same fountain as they, and is, indeed, its strongest and most precious jet; for it is the work of *imagination*, its highest and noblest function; and imagination comes from the illusion of the noumenon, and without it would not exist. While, then, for knowledge we must hold fast by the actual, for all the inspiration of life we must take refuge in the Ideal. Phenomenal and noumenal, the actual and the Ideal, together, and only together, make up the total of experience—of our vital Whole. In not less than this Whole are we to live,—

“Im Ganzen, Guten, Treuen resolut zu leben,”—

and the Good and the True are to be sought for in the Ideal; in the Ideal, not only as vaguely rendered in the visions of poetry or the solemnities of religion, but far more as framed, into organic epics of the mind, and turned with the force of systems upon action, by metaphysical invention. Nor let it be supposed that our knowledge of the purely poetic character of speculation will paralyze its power over conduct; though void of literal truth, its ethical truth is real; the conduct that it means is absolutely right. “A noble man,” to borrow Lange’s own words, “is not the least disturbed in his zeal for his ideals, though he be and must be told, and tells himself, that his ideal world, with all its settings of a God, immortal hopes and eternal truths, is a mere imagination and no reality: *these are all real because they are psychical images; they exist in the soul of man*, and woe to him who casts doubt upon their power!”

Having thus cleared up the “Stand-point of the Ideal,” Lange then turns to the view it affords of practical philosophy. He touches first the question of the worth of life, where his settlement

is this: Neither pessimism nor optimism is an absolute truth; the problem of evil, if we push for its radical solution, belongs to the transcendent world, of which we can know nothing. Applied, however, to the world of experience, the doctrine of the Ideal gives an optimist or pessimist result according as we consider life in its whole, with the Ideal in it, or only in its part—the part of actual, stubborn fact. The fact, in itself, must always seem *bad*; but it must be remembered that this very badness is the shock of contrast with the ever-present Ideal; and the optimist solution has, after all, to come from moral energy: play into fact with aspiration after the Ideal and enthusiasm for it, with the firm resolve to transform fact into a semblance of its pattern, and the reward will come in a gentler tolerance of defect and a calmer contentment: “the freer our career in the metaphysical region, the more is our world-image pervaded by sentiment, and the more optimistic; but the more ethical, also, is its reaction on our doings and bent. We are not only to reconstruct the actual after the Ideal, but to console ourselves for the perception of what actually is by contemplating what ought to be and might be.” The transition hence to ethics is natural, where the highest maxim is: *Serve the Whole*. But the Whole here intended is the entire complex of experience, with the active Ideal in it. “Work upon fact with recognition of its stubborn reality, but in the light of the Ideal,” is what the maxim means. We cannot *know* that we are free or immortal, but we cannot help assuming we are the one, and hoping we may be the other; and, on the other hand, we do know that in our relation with mechanical nature, in whose domain, after all, the larger part of our action lies, we are *not* free; that time is exceeding short, and enjoyment is hope deferred. The *lesson of life is chiefly fortitude and resignation*. Lange, however, has no personal drawings towards egoistic ethics, nor to hedonism, even in its most universal form. He announces himself here as the continuator of Kant: he desires to act, and have men act, from duty solely; to seek the Ideal, and serve it at all personal hazard, though with due regard to the imperfections of men and the obstinacy of fact. His sociology follows the lines we should now expect: his doctrine of the Whole leads him to a pronounced socialism, but he would have this socialism a real one, in which organized society is to correct the aberrations of the in-

dividual with vigor; he sees, too, like Dühring, the import of political economy in a comprehensive practical philosophy, and some of his earlier writings were devoted to vigorous discussions in it. Free trade and *Laissez-faire* can find no place, of course, in the practical theory of the moralist of the Whole. Spontaneous "harmony of private interests," and the talk of the Cobden school generally, is to him mere vagary, springing from a fatuous social optimism. In many essentials, however, he affiliates with Mill, while he derides Carey; whereby he fell into many an acrimonious dispute with Dühring, for the vitriol of whose sarcasm, too, he had but little relish. On the religious question, Lange aims at a purely ethical position: one religion is to him as good as another, provided it does the work of consecrating the Ideal and giving it practical influence with men. As for "rationalizing" religion, let it be done, if it must be done, in the interest of culture and taste, but beware of dreaming that in this way you are getting at truth! The Christian religion, for instance, we may retain in spirit, but in letter, No. Its entire ecclesiastical Symbol, in fact, whether cultus or creed, may freely stand as long as it can, *provided it be understood to mean nothing but a mode, strictly symbolic, of enshrining the Ideal in general.*

It is impossible not to recognize the seeming higher tone, both intellectual and moral, of Lange's general view as contrasted with that of either Hartmann or Dühring. The substitution of fortitude for despair on the one hand and for enjoyment on the other, unquestionably betokens a sounder moral feeling, while the standpoint of critical agnosticism is at least in so far more intellectual that it must be radically removed before any doctrinal procedure can be validly begun. The adroit preservation, too, of the play of the Ideal in the phenomenal whole is evidence of keen susceptibility to imagination, and to its necessity and value in the conduct of life. In this respect, Lange reminds us of Mill, though having far greater fervor of fancy, as the latter appears in his "Three Essays on Religion." Like Mill, too, he will prove in the end to have been a man of feeling rather than of intellect, determined in his judgments by the wants of his heart even more than by the lights of his head. We cannot long conceal it from ourselves, that his belief in the ethical energy of the Ideal is without foundation in his theoretic view; that to talk of *duty* based on what we

know to be pure fiction of the fantasy is a hollow mockery; that the sole excuse that agnosticism can put forward for acting under the Ideal is the anodyne this offers for the otherwise insupportable pain of existence: nor are there wanting clear indications that Lange forebodes the spectral nature of even this excuse—that he divines the foregone failure of a remedy applied in defiance of our knowledge that its essence is illusion. Vaihinger, himself a positively *fey* agnostic, says truly enough: ¹ “There breathes through this view of Lange’s a strain of tragic resignation. . . . A lofty moral pathos speaks out in all that Lange teaches, and in his manner of teaching it.” Like Carlyle, when gazing upwards at the silent stars rolling through the solemn and trackless night, and seeing there the image and type of all existence, he can only ejaculate: “Ech, it’s a *sad* sight, and we maun e’en mak’ the best o’t!” For him, life has reduced itself to the phenomenon of a phenomenon, to contradictions born of one fundamental contradiction, and that an illusion we can never dispel. The professed “critique of reason” has ended in representing reason as essentially irrational—the self-harmonious turns out to be a thoroughgoing discord, our “organization” is disorganization. Nor can all the seeming glow of the “Ideal” blind us to the outreaching of this contradiction into Lange’s doctrine of action. The Ideal is put forward as an end in itself; but it is in reality only viewed, and by the agnostic *can* only be viewed, as a means to the suppression of disgust with life. Thus Lange proclaims duty, but his principle is actually pleasure; he denounces egoism, but cannot surmount hedonism; he declares for the autonomy of the will, but his doctrine forces a strict heteronomy. He stands professedly for a stern socialism, the sovereignty of the Whole as the organization of the Ideal; but in his theory there lurks the uttermost atomism: so many individual fantasies, so many systems of the Ideal; and, for each, the sacred “duty” of meeting the antagonism of the countless other illusions with becoming fortitude and resignation. And, truly, so long as existence is thus shut in to mere appearance, its ghostliness cannot but betray itself in all its movements. If, with Hart-

¹ Dr. Hans Vaihinger: “Hartmann, Dühring, und Lange: ein kritischer Essay.” Iserlohn, 1876. A book full of interest and of acute criticism, though marred by diffuseness and extravagance. I have found it a valuable aid.

mann, the universe becomes a colossal and shadowy Blind Tom, endowed with a clairvoyance whose infallible "intelligence" displays itself in striking through æons with fatal precision at its own existence; and, with Dühring, a gigantic Automaton Chess-Player, matched against itself, and moving with balanced "charm" to the checkmating of its own game: with Lange, it fades into a phantom Panorama, in front of which sits Man, a forlorn imbecile maundering over a Perhaps behind it, and shaking the flimsy rattle of the "Ideal" in the fatuous persuasion that he is stilling the irrepressible sob in his heart. Let it do its best, agnostic philosophy cannot make of life anything but essential delirium—with the shapes of its phantasmagory distinct enough, to be sure, and with an all too fatal persistency in the recurrence of its wanderings—but delirium still. In the wan light of "critical" thinking,

"We are such stuff

As dreams are made of, and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep."

It is, however, no proper refutation of a theory to show its evil practical results. It is a just retort for all such reproaches, to say: "Yes, our fate is heavy and our prospects are desperate; but what does that do towards disproving the fact?" It is true enough that Lange's ethical structure breaks down, and that the gap between it and his theory is a discredit to his intellect, but his "critical" view is not to be displaced except by strictly theoretical means: his procedure must be forced to expose contradictions, or else both that and its results must be accepted. Should it, however, prove to be self-contradictory, it will annul itself and its presupposed principle. And such a contradiction it plainly involves. Its principle is that the *a priori* nature of our cognition prohibits us from assuming that we can know by means of it things as they are. This is but another way of saying that we are forbidden to assume that it is anything more than a peculiarity of man; it is an endowment of humanity, and whether its "forms" are those of possible other intelligences, or of intelligence universally, we can never know; and for the reason that we are shut in by the "limiting notion" of the Thing-in-itself. This principle, now, Lange will carry out with unflinching comprehensiveness: it must be extended to include even the fundamental distinction

between our phenomenal world of experience and the noumenal Thing.

This aim of Lange's comes from a genuine systemic insight; not only is it true in the general that a principle, to be such, must work in its sphere with unlimited universality, but in this particular case the omission of the contrast between consciousness and things from the compass of phenomenalism would be fatal to the claims of the latter as a principle. If the notion of Thing-in-itself be more than phenomenal, then there *is* a Thing-in-itself, and in cognizing the contrast in question, in putting the judgment *There are Things-in-themselves*, we put a judgment of absolute validity, and see by the light of intelligence *as such*—with the eye of all possible intelligences: which would force upon the agnostic the further perilous question, By which of our merely subjective categories, then, do we manage this astonishing achievement? The admission of this one noumenal judgment would open the entire agnostic mechanism of the *a priori* to the inroad of the absolute. In some way, then, it must be reduced to a mere conjecture: it will not do to dissipate it wholly, for then, not only would another absolute judgment arise in its place, namely, *There are no Things-in-themselves*, but the validity of this would put an end to phenomenalism forever: if there *is* no Thing-in-itself, then our cognition, call it by the name of "subjective" as long as we may, is the cognition of all that is—the objects that we represent to ourselves in our normal and in our potential activity are the only objects, and human intelligence has a universal quality, knowing its objects as all intelligences must know them.

With the instinct of self-preservation, then, Lange draws the mentioned distinction back within the sphere of consciousness; this, too, he will have us refrain from using as if applicable to the absolute; we must treat this also as phenomenal, and hence we cannot be sure that there is, or is not, a Thing-in-itself. But we now cannot silence the apprehension that there *may* be one. Hence, the distinction remains, and Thing-in-itself becomes a *limiting notion*—the antithetic formula of *Me and Not-me* becomes an all-encompassing category (in fact, our fundamental *a priori* principle) that necessarily causes all our cognition to *seem* merely subjective, whether it be so in reality or not, and thus compels us to limit our certainty to phenomena. Its agnostic force is, there-

fore, rather increased than diminished; we have now not a single cognition remaining that can pretend to belong to intelligence *as such*.

It cannot now longer be concealed, however, that, in setting out upon this path, Lange was moving to a goal that he little suspected and still less desired. He has decided that, to validate the phenomenal limitation of knowledge, he must make Thing-in-itself a "form" *a priori*. But he must be in earnest with this apriority, and a "form" *a priori* means a principle from and in consciousness organically and *solely*. To say that a notion is a *priori* is to say that the thought of it exhausts its existence, possibilities, and essence altogether; the entire being of it is in a native energy of consciousness, and this elemental *discharge* from consciousness is the whole meaning of the corresponding name; thus, for instance, the pure thoughts corresponding to the words *space*, *time*, *cause*, are exactly and utterly what space, time, and cause respectively *are*. Anything short of this view would render apriority null; for, if there were anything wholly *extra mentem* to which they, even possibly, corresponded, we could then never be certain that they *originated* in consciousness at all—we should remain in a quandary as to whether they did or did not—yet from consciousness they *must* originate in order to give them that absolute universality and necessity of application to their objects with which we incontestably think them: as a genuine Kantian, Lange must assent to this; and not simply assent, but proceed from it wholly and thoroughly. To make Thing-in-itself a "form" *a priori* is, therefore, to *exclude* its existence in any other sense. But this annuls the desired conjecture of its possible absolute existence; we have committed ourselves irretrievably, then, to the judgment, *There are no Things-in-themselves*; and therewith, as shown already, an act of absolute cognition enters, and phenomenalism falls to the ground. The "critical" procedure has annulled its own principle.

Lange is, however, equal to the emergency; he has that dogged and indomitable courage which cannot realize its own defeat. The rally on a new point explains his doctrine that this ground-form of consciousness, as he considers it—this contrast between consciousness and Thing-in-itself—is an organic contradiction. He would evade the force of the above conclusion by showing that

Thing-in-itself is not the real contents of that *a priori* notion which forms the "limiting term" in the relation in question. On the contrary, that term is an *hypostasis*—an imaginary "embodiment," a putting as beyond, independent of, or *plus* consciousness—of its own system of internal categories appertaining to phenomenal objects; in short, a putting of the notions of substance, cause, and interagent, as if they transcended conscious experience, and existed apart from it as its object and ground. The *a priori* category of substance and accident (subject and predicate), which properly only connects one composite phenomenon (called the "subject" of a judgment) with another phenomenon so as to compose a new and fuller unity, lends its term *substance* for this purpose; the category of cause and effect, which properly connects one phenomenon with another so as to condition and determine the latter's occurrence, lends similarly its term *cause*; and, in like manner, the category of agent and reagent, which properly connects phenomena into a system of mutual attraction and repulsion, lends its term *agent*. Thus, this triune hypostasis is, by some *a priori* impulse, which Lange does not attempt to explain, projected beyond the limits of remaining consciousness, and is thought as one term of the so-called noumenal relation, while consciousness as a whole constitutes the complementary term—its "organization" (as Lange calls it) being viewed as *reagent*, and its sum of phenomena as *effect* and *predicate*. By this spontaneous contradiction of the proper nature of its categorical system, our consciousness, confounding its own organic notions with the hypostatic notion of a Thing-in-itself, sets a bound to its own certainty by an illusion which, as *a priori*, it can never dispel.

The justness of this analysis, so far as it goes, is self-evident: we have doubtless here the correct partial genealogy of the remarkable notion Thing-in-itself, and the exact genesis of all "critical" agnosticism. There is wanting in it, however, the all-important fact that it is the co-agency of the other *a priori* elements, space and time, with those actually mentioned, that imparts to this notion its specific character and chief plausibility. The infinity of these two elements, in contrast with the necessary finitude of all sensuous representations and of the total of sensible experience, together with our natural tendency to ignore those *other* elements in consciousness—the strictly supersensible—and to take

our ease in the more familiar region where time and space render all things plain, makes the inadvertence of supposing an "*abundant room*" for "existence wholly out of consciousness" and, as we say, "independent" of it, an easy matter; an inadvertence stimulated by the incessant activity of the other categories, but engendered by a deeper principle, *which Lange's omission to investigate is the vital defect of his analysis*, leaving it a quite inadequate account of the nature and function of the notion Noumenon; of which, further presently. We thus think the Thing-in-itself as extended or at least as enduring, even when we view it as the soul or as God, and this is the source of all that mechanical psychology and viciously anthropomorphic theology which has been, and is now, the bane of religion, and the constant cause of scepticism and indifference. With the addition now made, we have the correct account of that travesty of the Noumenon which we call Thing-in-itself, and may now attend to the real meaning of Lange's result.

And this is striking enough. For he has, in fact, unwittingly completed the demonstration of the absolute quality of human knowledge; and, at the same time, that of the necessary falsehood of materialism—not simply the permanent impossibility of *proving* it (which, as we saw, he had already done from his agnostic standpoint), but its *absolute* impossibility; for he has removed the basis for even its hypothesis. He has shown now (1) that the Thing-in-itself does not exist; (2) that, as notion, it is a self-contradiction—something whose sphere is solely *within* consciousness putting itself as if it were *beyond* it; (3) that, in spite of this, we continue, and must continue, to accept this illusion, which compels us to limit our knowledge to experience, and renounce all claims to its being absolute.

That is to say, then, *the sole cause of our doubting the rigorous validity of our knowledge, and reducing our cognition to the mere idiosyncrasy of one species out of an unknown number of possible orders of intelligent beings, is an illusion whose genesis we know, a contradiction that we distinctly detect*. Then, beyond all controversy, *our discrediting and limitation of our cognitive faculty is an error, and we are to correct it by disregarding its cause*.

And it is idle to say that we cannot do this, because the illusion is organic, and will therefore continue to play upon us for-

ever. Now that it is once detected, it is *completely in our power*, so far as its affecting our judgment is concerned. The presence of organic and necessary illusions in the faculty of cognition, especially in its function as sense, is an unquestionable fact (the multi-form phenomena of refraction, for instance), but, from the moment we know them as organic and necessary, they cannot mislead us, because to know them as such we must trace their origin in the necessary laws of the function they affect; we thenceforward learn to *interpret them*—as signs, namely, of a complexity in our system of consciousness far richer and more various than we had at first suspected,—of a harmony of antagonisms far more manifold and overlapped one within another than we had dreamed of; and the more wide-embracing their recurrences become, each time detected and corrected, the more do we gradually rise to the conception of the self-sufficiency of our intelligence. And the power of detecting and allowing for them comes just from their being organic, and depends upon that. We are, therefore, now in the position, by the investigation through which Lange has led us, to assure ourselves of the reality—the absoluteness in *quality*—of our human intelligence. From the Kantian doctrine of the *a priori* carried to its genuine completion, as we have now seen it, we infer that the objects which present themselves in course of the normal and critical action of human consciousness are all that objects *as* objects can be; that beyond or beneath what completed human reason (moral, of course, as well as perceptive and reflective) finds—*finds*, I do not say *fathoms*—in objects and their relations, or *will* find, there is nothing to *be* found; that *our* universe is *the* universe, which exists, so far as we know it, precisely as we know it, and indeed *in* and *through* our knowing it, though not merely *by* that.

The process that has led us to this result, and which may properly be called a *Critique of all Scepticism*, yields, moreover, the final impossibility of materialism. We saw, some distance back, that the *actual* of sense could by no possibility be the source of consciousness, being, on the contrary, its mere phenomenon—its mere externalized presentation (picture-object) originated from within. But the hypothetical *potential* of sense, the assumed sub-sensible *substance* called matter, we have now seen to be precisely that self-contradiction called the Thing-in-itself, and it therefore

disappears from the real universe along with that illusion. We have also, then, a definitive *Critique of all Materialism*.

By the path into which Lange has led us, we therefore ascend from the agnostic-critical stand-point to the higher and invigorating one of thorough, all-sided, and affirmative *idealism*. A few words must suffice to outline its general conception. Our result, then, is this: Our normal consciousness has the trait of universality: it puts judgments that, in the same circumstances, every intelligence, and every order of intelligence, would put; and the objects it perceives, and *as* it perceives them, are the same that, under the same conditions, all intelligences would perceive; for objects are themselves but complexes of its judgments, and the mentioned circumstances and conditions are, indeed, *part* of the objects as perceived—not limitations imposed upon consciousness from without, but particularizations of its own primordial processes. Or, to put the case inversely: The potential reach of normal human consciousness is what we *mean* by universality: intelligence *as such* is simply the *fulfilment* of human intelligence. The attempt to take the universe as beyond or apart from or *plus* consciousness, has sublated itself into the bringing of the universe wholly within and conterminous with consciousness; and the ancient by-word, *Man the measure of all things*, comes round again, but with a new and pregnant meaning. Only, this universe-consciousness must be thought as it *is*, without omission or exaggeration of any of its contents, and, above all, by mastering the grounds of its existence and the method of its possibility. All that is, comes within consciousness, and lies open to it—the literal *All*, whether “starry heavens without” or “moral law within,” sensible system of nature with its bond of mechanical causation or intelligible system of moral agency with its bond of free allegiance constituting a “Kingdom of Ends”—a world of *spirits*, with the Father of Spirits omnipresent in all: consciousness means *that*. In being conscious, we are conscious of a *universe*—wherein each of us, to put the case in a metaphor (inadequate, of course), is a single focal point upon which the one ensphering Whole of light is poured in rays that are reflected back again to its utmost verge, and thence returned to be again reflected and returned, and so on without end, each added return bringing rays in greater fulness from remoter and remoter confines. Consciousness and universe

are in truth but two names for the same single, indissoluble and continuous Fact, named in the one case as if from within it, and in the other as if from without. Not that in every conscious focus all the contents of this universe are imaged with the same clearness, or reflected forth with the same energy, as in every other; only that, dim or bright, strong or feeble, confused or distinct, the same Whole is in some wise or other always there. And it is not to be overlooked that, to the fulfilment of this universe-consciousness, it is essential that it be not simply an individual, but a social, an historic, and, in fact, an immortal consciousness. The grounds for this conception it is not our place to enter upon here; it is enough to say that the interpretation of the facts of ordinary consciousness into the rigorous necessity of their implying this absolute Universal is the business and achievement of a genuine *Critique of Reason*. Of the method and result of this it need only be added that it proceeds to the adequate explanation both of the *a priori* categories, of which we have now heard so much, and of that residual *Noumenon* which we saw that Lange left unexamined; it finds the explanation of the former, and the reality of the latter, in a single Conscious Principle, of the absoluteness and all-transcending infinity of which the vague notion *Noumenon* is only our native confused feeling, while the categories are merely its modes of manifestation, which, though they seem so different to our natural view, turn out, on critical investigation, to be one and the same single Synthetical Energy—simply a *necessary* nexus between all possible separate terms of sense. This Principle, as blending into one, by its ascending retreat from the categories, the two activities of absolute Subject and absolute Cause, is the one Creative Unity. The universe-consciousness thus passes from an apparent mere Fact into a pure Act. And this Act, as determining itself through a system of conscious subjects—*loci* or *vortices* of the categories—into that uttermost particularity of consciousness which we name sensible perception, clasps together in its living process both Subject and Object, and is thus strictly *personal*—the Person of persons.

It is plain, of course, that the truth of all this hangs upon the validity of the doctrine of the *a priori*. It is a noteworthy fact, then, that Lange, as agnostic, sees that he must by no means admit the theory according to which alone the establishment of the

a priori is possible. To determine that its principles are veritably underived from its objects, consciousness must, of course, be capable of an act in which it extricates itself from its world of sensible objects, and contemplates its cognitive equipment strictly *per se*—an act which thus *transcends experience*, and was, consequently and fitly, named by Kant “transcendental reflection;” an act, moreover, whose execution presupposes the power not only of using the apparatus of judgment upon elements that are not sensible objects at all—in short, that the categories *can* be applied beyond sensuous experience—but also of making judgments of absolute validity, since the decision that anything is organic in us must be a decision upon our real nature, as it appears, say, to the mind of our Creator. This presupposition is radically at variance with Kant’s subsequent *finis* to his theoretical critique, and with Lange’s acceptance and development of it. It is in keeping with this, now, that Lange takes the astonishing ground that the contents of our *a priori* endowment can only be determined by induction—a manifest contradiction, as an induction, despite its formal generality, is always a *particular* judgment, while, to establish the apriority of an element, we must show it to be not only universal, but necessary. It is plain, then, that Lange has here finally abandoned the properly Kantian stand-point, and, without intending it, has really gone back to that of Locke, where he and his followers may be left, without further concern, to the thoroughgoing surgery of Hume.¹

PHILOSOPHY IN THE GERMAN UNIVERSITIES.

As peculiar to the universities, because of the severe technical training requisite to the pursuit of the problems involved, the most novel, and, therefore, most immediately interesting phenomenon is that of the men who have frankly abandoned *a priori* ground altogether, and are, as they are persuaded, engaged in the task, patient and humble, but alone truly valuable, of laying in slow and careful experiments the foundation for a future empirical metaphysics that is to take away from that province of thought

¹ Among the leading Neo-Kantians, after Lange, are Professors Cohen, of Marburg; Bona Meyer, of Bonn; Benno Erdmann, of Kiel; and Dr. Hans Vaihinger, of Strassburg.

its present reproach, and to give it the dignity of a science. They have thus, with full purpose, taken up the position that Lange has unintentionally prepared for his followers. Their object is stated in the same general terms as that of Spencer, and, particularly, as that of Mill and Bain, but their occupations and methods are materially different. The Englishmen rely, indeed, upon experience as the sole basis of evidence; but they have deemed it already possible to raise upon it vast and complicated theoretical superstructures, which have, as they acknowledge, only that "probable" evidence which induction affords. The German party, on the contrary, hold that results in the form of law and system are only to be the reward of their remote successors. They refer us to the fruitful but tedious and long unrewarded labors of the age before and around Galileo, which ushered in the career of modern science—labors in the patient and minute *measurement* of phenomena. The character of exact science can only begin in a body of knowledge when it has risen to the point of being computable; and formulas of computation are to be generalized only after long periods of measuring and remeasuring the phenomena involved. When varying phenomena can once be connected by some sufficiently simple law of quantitative interdependence, generalizations, on a great and unexpected scale, may be effected by the computational apparatus of the calculus.

It is singular, however, that this school really had its origin in one of the most intense metaphysical movements of the old-fashioned kind that Germany has known; I say *intense* purposely, for the number of its participants has always been small compared with that of the followers, or professed followers, of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. I refer to the philosophy of Herbart, who was Kant's successor at Königsberg, and who, seizing on Kant's notion of Things-in-themselves, worked out a metaphysical theory on the hypothesis that, behind all the phenomenal particulars and genera of experience, there lay a real world of corresponding distinctions in the Things-in-themselves—a singular new form of atomism, not strictly materialistic, however, but somewhat more akin to the monadology of Leibnitz, these units of reality (or *Reals*, as Herbart called them) being some spiritual and others material. Out of this metaphysics grew up a vigorous school of psychology, to which Fechner brought, together with fresh and

often quite mystical speculations, a remarkable body of researches, aiming to establish mathematical relations between inward sensation and its outward conditions. From these came the now noted formula, called Fechner's Law, in which the principle is stated that "the intensity of a sensation varies directly as the logarithm of its stimulus." These researches now have attracted all that class of minds with the requisite training in the exact sciences, and the requisite eye for broad generalizations, that would otherwise busy themselves with ordinary inquiries into nature, and whose bent is to an empirical logic. They are busy at laborious experiments upon all sorts of mental phenomena that can by any possibility be got into a sensible form capable of measurement, and their ingenuity of invention and method in these regions is truly astonishing. Their labors affiliate, of course, with those of the investigators in physiological psychology; indeed, the two investigations go usually hand in hand, though the measurement part belongs properly to what is called psychophysics. The aim here is suggested by the title—to establish a mechanics of mental experience. This is one day to do for psychology the analogue of what physics has done for natural philosophy—enable us to pass to the social, race, and historical laws of human action, as we have passed to the laws of matter not merely on the earth's surface, but in the distant celestial regions. When these psychophysical laws shall have one day reached a sufficient generality, they will afford, the new school predict, an accurate foundation for speculation and verifiable theorizing on the basis of probability, just as in the natural world physical principles have done for the correlation of forces, the conservation of energy, the wave theory of light, and the nebular hypothesis or its possible correction.

This account may not unfitly close with a brief reference to the philosophic situation at the University of Berlin, as it presented itself to my own observation in the winter semester of 1881-'82. It may be taken as typical of what is going on in the whole of Germany, Berlin being confessedly the German intellectual centre. All the phases of the present state of transition, as I have endeavored to describe them,¹ were reflected there. One notice-

¹ See the remarks already referred to, in "The Concord Lectures."

able fact, especially in the light of Professor Wundt's statement of five years ago,¹ was that of two courses of lectures on Schopenhauer. The drift of these was unfavorable, to be sure, but both of them betrayed the fact that Schopenhauer's doctrine of the nature of the will, apart from his metaphysical and ethical uses of it, had made an effective impression on the lecturers. Wundt could say, in 1877, that to that date Schopenhauer had met with no consideration in the universities whatever. But it is now plain that his doings have taken some root even there, and in directions that must prolong the present inability to surmount the agnostic and empirical obstacles. For not only at Berlin did he have a good hearing, but in several of the other universities too. In fact, in the whole of Germany, there were some nine or ten courses then given upon him—a greater amount of attention than any other single thinker received, excepting only Kant, Plato, and Aristotle.

But, to resume, Berlin, in 1881-'82, was a fair reflection of the general conditions I have already depicted. From the venerable Michelet—in his eighty-second year, lecturing with astonishing vigor and admirable powers of exposition on "German Philosophy since Kant," and vindicating himself, in this course at least, from the charge so frequently in past days brought against him, of belonging to the "left wing" of the Hegelian school—to young Dr. Ebbinghaus, a representative of the psychophysical empiricists, pretty much all the phases of the present situation were at hand—the vanishing remembrance of the great spirits of the bygone generation, the transitional uncertainty evinced in the dominant attention to history, the vivid interest in the agnostic interpretations of Kant, the fresh and animated attachment to empirical views, the faith in the great future awaiting the new studies in psychophysics. Zeller, who began philosophical life as a Hegelian, and may be reckoned the latest, perhaps the last, illustrious product of that school, but who wearied of the "Dialectic," and now seems to find in Spinoza, construed in a Hegelian sense, better satisfaction than in any other modern thinker, was almost wholly occupied, of course, with historical instruction. In his auditorium the great throng of the *philosophiæ studiosi*—five or

¹ See Wundt on "Philosophy in Germany," in *Mind* for July, 1877.

six hundred—was to be found; there he lectured daily, with speech fluent and gracious, and with an exhaustiveness and an ease of learning that were not less than overwhelming. Althaus, another of the elder generation, busied himself with psychology and Aristotle. Paulsen, who, from his vigor of early middle-age, his professorial rank, and his already extended reputation, is probably to be regarded as the rising man in philosophy at Berlin, and whose audience, next to Zeller's, was much the largest, defended, on grounds wholly empirical, a frank impersonal pantheism, making great use of a peculiar and interesting form of the argument from history—a striking enrichment and deepening of the old proof *de consensu gentium*; he put it that advancing social and historical experience is the tribunal of probable truth, that impersonal pantheism has grown with the growth of this experience, and thus exhibits all the probability that the approval of this tribunal can afford. His definition of philosophy, too, is in keeping with his empiricism; its essential identity with science is a favorite thesis of his, and he defines it accordingly as the inclusive whole (*Inbegriff*) of all sciences.¹ Of the *privat-docenten*, Dr. Lasson lectured on the philosophy of rights—a descendant of Hegel's school, but, like the rest of the younger men in Germany now, with no decided claim to a truly penetrating insight into the master's doctrine; he talked of Hegel as “a literary classic”—a symptom of questionable significance. Dr. Ebbinghaus expounded Kant in the agnostic and empiristic sense, lectured on Schopenhauer, and gave vigorous lessons in psychophysics. Dr. Deussen lectured on Hindoo philosophy, which had the look of further stirrings from Schopenhauer and further foundations for his influence. Finally, Dr. Gizycki, an empiricist, principally interested in the English moralists of the last century, gave courses on Shaftesbury and on ethics from the stand-point of the development hypothesis.

A mighty purgative for these agnostic and empirical tendencies would possibly be found, were the Germans to betake themselves

¹ Professor Paulsen is the author of a very noticeable work on Kant—the “History of the Development of Kant's Theory of Knowledge”—on which his reputation mainly rests. This has been followed recently by another, with the title “What Kant may be for Us.” He holds that Kant attained no stand-point essentially higher than Hume's, and that Hume was not properly a sceptic, but only denied the capacity of reason to judge of truths of fact.

to a thorough study of Hume, not in the more literary and much abated form in which he appears in the "Essays," but in his unconstrained masterpiece, the "Treatise of Human Nature." So far as I could discover, this work is well-nigh unknown in Germany. Zeller, of course, was well acquainted with it, and, besides, had no need of its cure; but, excepting him, no one at Berlin seemed to have made any thorough study of it, nor does recent philosophical literature anywhere in Germany give any signs of such study. Yet, in the Fourth Part of its First Book, Hume has himself furnished the key to the destruction of the empirical position and its resulting agnosticism. There he is not content to stop with his ordinary doctrine, that experience can give no more than the sensation of the present moment; but goes on to show—whether of full purpose or not it seems impossible to decide—that, without presupposing the abiding unity of personal identity, even that fleeting presentation is impossible. But this permanence of personal identity he had, by the rigorous logic of empiricism, already done away with, and all perception—all experience, even to its simplest term, was thus reduced to illusion. The contradiction between this and the empirical principle, which derives its whole force from the assumed absoluteness of the single sensation, is obvious; and what Hume has really done, then, and quite irrefutably, is to remove that principle finally. True is it indeed, that, without the Abiding in us, the transitory and sensible is impossible. Or, as it has been most forcibly put in a saying that deserves to become classic, "Our unconditioned universality is the ground of our existence;"—its *ground*; that is, at once its necessary condition and its Sufficient Reason.